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MODELLING THE SET-UP AND MANAGEMENT OF A SPINOUT: 
EVIDENCE FROM A CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we explore a special case of venturing, namely the spinout approach. 
More in particular, this paper has sought to model the spin-out process by combining 
scholarly literature with an empirical analysis of the spinout process of Royal Dutch 
Shell. Through literature review we have identified multiple factors relevant for 
spinout success, which are captured in a practical assessment model. In doing so, we 
have provided managers with a phased approach showing the critical steps that have 
to be taken in the decision, set-up and management phases of a spinout. The added 
value of the introduced assessment model is that it treats a spinout as an ongoing 
process of enacting set-ups, rather than a static event. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a business environment characterized by rapid, complex and radical technological 
changes, large established companies are increasingly looking for ways to acquire 
new technological capabilities and explore new business opportunities in order to 
survive in the long run (Govindarajan and Trimble,  2005; Vanhaverbeke and Peeters, 
2005). Accordingly firms increasingly rely on corporate venture capital as a means of 
developing new competencies and expanding into new businesses (Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2005; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Maula et al., 2003; Katila et al. 2008). 
Corporate venture capital can be defined as minority equity investments by 
established firms in external entrepreneurial ventures (Sahaym et al, 2009, p.2).  
 In this paper we explore a special case of corporate venturing, i.e. the spinout 
approach, which has become increasingly popular in business life in the past few 
years (Jagersma and van Gorp, 2003). A spinout refers to a certain type of corporate 
venture capital whereby a company "splits off" sections of itself as a separate 
entrepreneurial business. Moreover, the parent company receives (minority) equity 
stakes in the newly spun out venture. Although we witness a strong growth in spinout 
activity during the last decades, an academic-wide accepted definition is still missing 
(Tubke, Saavedra and Gonzalez, 2004). We define a spinout as a divestiture of the 
parent firm's assets (which can include structures, products, patents or personnel) into 
a newly created entity that is open to separate external financing (adapted from 
Ledbetter and Zipkin, 2002). In addition we would like to stress that in our definition 
of spinouts the spun-out venture is not seen as an entity gone forever, but over time 
might be bought back and integrated into the parent company again.  
 Spinouts have been a topic of interest in many scientific fields such as 
entrepreneurship, strategic management and innovation management (Tubke, 
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Saavedra & Gonzalez, 2004). Nonetheless, despite this increasing interest, there 
seems to be no clear understanding of how to come to a systematic approach with 
respect to the set up and management of a spinout. For example, previous research 
(i.e. Burgelman et al., 2004; Chesbrough 2003a, 2003b; Ito, 1995; McElroy, 2003) has 
elucidated on key motives for organizations to create spinouts, which are strongly 
related to the benefits for the parent firm when undertaking a spinout and to a lesser 
extent to the benefits from the venture's point of view. However, this still leaves 
unexplained how to realize the potential benefits of spinouts, and equally important 
how to avoid the high failure rate of spinouts. Other studies of spinouts include the 
rate at which incumbent firms generate spinouts, the factors that underly the 
performance of spinouts and the effects of spinouts on their parent firms (Klepper, 
2009). Yet, a lot of attention in these studies is focused on the spinout creation itself 
and not on its further development by the parent firm into a sustainable venture 
(Hellmann, 2007; Siegel et al., 2007).  
 So, based on the above, we can state that with a few exceptions (see Agrawal 
et al., 2004; Lord et al., 2002), literature has largely been silent with respect to the 
advanced set up and management of a spinout. This is an important limitation of 
current research as we argue that a parent firm can only profit from the advantages of 
using spinouts in a strategic manner when it is able to set-up and manage spinouts in a 
systematic way. The latter implies that spinouts are set up with full awareness of all 
potential advantages and disadvantages related to the choice for this path to bring a 
technology to the market and that success factors of the spinout approach are fully 
leveraged. It also entails that spinout management focuses on a continuous 
reconfiguration of the initial set-up dimensions and in doing so, management can 
overcome the inherent deficits of a static set-up model for spinouts. In short, the 
 5
contribution of this paper is to address the above mentioned void in the literature by 
offering a coherent model illustrating how to setup and manage a spinout in a 
systematic and ongoing way.  
 This paper is structured as following. In the next section, we will discuss the 
different reasons for organizations to set-up spinouts. Next, we elaborate on the set-up 
structure of the spinout venture and its management. Thereafter, the research 
methodology is discussed, followed by a qualitative empirical analysis of a spinout at 
Royal Dutch Shell. In the last section, we discuss the main findings, draw a number of 
conclusions from this research and briefly present some topics for future research.  
 
THEORY 
To assess whether the option to spin out a venture is a realistic path to commercialize 
a company’s ideas we will first discuss the reasons for organizations to set-up 
spinouts. Generating this understanding is very useful, as a complete consideration of 
the existing advantages and disadvantages is a prerequisite for solid decision-making 
concerning the selection of spinouts with relatively high chances of success. Second, 
although we take a corporate point of view in this paper we will also identify some 
important conditions related to the venture itself and its external investors1. We will 
first summarize the reasons for large companies to set up spinouts. Next we describe 
how spinouts can be set up and managed successfully by their parent company.    
 
Reasons to set-up spinouts 
                                                 
1
 We focus in this paper on the relationship between the parent and the venture. Venture capitalists or 
other investors only appear in the analysis when they have an influence on the relationship between the 
parent and the venture. We choose this approach to keep the analysis tractable.   
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Large companies spin-out ventures for different reasons and there are several 
advantages for a parent firm to pursue a spinout (see table 1 for a short overview). 
First, setting up spinouts can speed-up the internal deployment of R&D output 
(Chesbrough 2003a). This is especially true when the option to use spinouts for 
monetizing R&D output is agreed contractually with a semi-external party such as a 
corporate VC unit. In that case, the new venture puts pressure on the internal business 
units to speed up the internal innovation process. Second, spinouts stimulate an 
entrepreneurial environment that many organizations strive for (Burgelman et al., 
2004). Researchers will feel motivated and empowered to know that their R&D 
efforts are likely to be turned into a new process or product inside or outside the 
organization. If a venture does not fit into the corporate strategy it still has the chance 
to become a viable venture as a spinout. This increased probability of success will 
empower researchers at the parent organization to make faster decisions, take more 
individual risk and have a greater individual identification with the business 
opportunities latent in the technical resources of the company (Chesbrough, 2003a). In 
this sense spinouts are a vehicle for spurring growth and entrepreneurial initiative 
within the organization (Block and Macmillan, 1993; Chesbrough, 2003b). As a 
consequence, an external path to market can positively influence the speed of the 
internal path to market as well. Third, managing spin-outs is a very valuable 
experience for managers inside an organization. The experience of actually managing 
a small entrepreneurial business and coping with high technology and/or market 
uncertainty, are very interesting to increase the competences of top-management of 
large established organizations (Ito, 1995; McElroy, 2003). In addition, having 
spinout ventures helps to recruit and retain highly skilled researchers since the spinout 
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actively makes use of their ideas instead of putting them on the shelf (Chesbrough, 
2003a).   
Besides speeding up the internal deployment of ideas, spinouts can be used as 
a mechanism to commercialize technology more cost- and time-efficient than projects 
that are commercialized within the parent organization. Spinouts are more efficient 
because of their relatively simpler organization, allowing its staff to take ownership of 
the decision-making process, and because of a reward system that is better adapted to 
develop and commercialize the technology (McElroy, 2003). Spinouts are not only 
more efficient, but they can also be used to commercialize disruptive technologies that 
have the ability to cannibalize the current business structure (Burgelman et al., 2004; 
Drucker, 1974). This advantage applies when R&D targets to fulfill the needs of 
current customers of the parent organization in a different way, which does not fit the 
existing organization's processes or values. Another potential advantage is that by 
commercializing technology through spinouts, the parent company can maintain 
strategic coherence (McElroy, 2003). The advantage of creating strategic coherence 
applies to a situation in which an organization commercializes R&D for smaller, 
emerging markets through a semi-external organization like a spinout, and hence the 
current business structure of the organization is not affected. This is needed as large 
organizations cannot be expected to allocate too much of their critical financial and 
human resources into small, emerging markets (Burgelman et al., 2004). However, 
spinouts can over time create a strong position in emerging markets, and the parent 
company can decide to incorporate its spinout when matured, e.g. have a better fit 
with the businesses of the parent organization. Another potential advantage for an 
organization to set-up a spinout is that it can explore future technologies and markets 
for the parent organization. Spinouts provide a strategic advantage for the parent 
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organization to engage in promising new areas outside the existing scope of the 
company, but with a potential future interest (Dahlstrand, 1997). Next to that, spinouts 
can generate synergies with the current products – and services portfolio of the parent 
organization (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Finally, spinouts are often the only possible 
path to market to commercialize a technology. Especially R&D output that does not 
match the existing technology strategy and/or lacks initially the requested commercial 
viability will remain on the shelf inside a parent organization (Chesbrough, 2003a, 
2003b). Having a spinout option available as a path for R&D output will correct the 
false negative judgments of the parent organization. False negative judgments are 
projects that initially are judged as commercially unattractive, but which later turn out 
to be valuable (Chesbrough, 2003a). This is especially the case when the technology 
of the venture is still in an embryonic phase laden with a lot of technical and market 
uncertainty. Once these uncertainties have been reduced to an acceptable level, a 
parent company can decide to spin in the venture or to acquire it based on its first 
right to purchase the venture2.     
Besides the advantages of undertaking spinouts, there are some important 
challenges or disadvantages for the parent firm to consider. The first potential 
disadvantage for an organization to set-up spinouts is the high risk of failure (Lord et 
al., 2002). In general, the high failure rate of spinouts can be imputed to the high 
technical and market uncertainty, which both need to be managed in a context outside 
the boundaries of the parent organization. Second, selecting the wrong spinouts, or 
even too many spinouts, can hollow-out the parent firm's business by loosing core 
staff and core activities (Davenport et al., 2002). The last potential disadvantage is 
                                                 
2
  Venture capital funds who invested in the spinout usually allow the parent to acquire the venture 
under the condition that there is an open acquisition procedure which guarantees that the parent 
company pays a price in line with the market value of the venture.  
 9
that a spinout has the freedom to decide about its own strategic direction, which is not 
always in line with the interests of the parent organization (Chesbrough, 2003a).   
 
---------- Insert table 1 about here ---------- 
 
Next to the potential advantages and disadvantages for the parent organization, 
we can also identify several pros and cons from the perspective of the spinout venture 
(see table 2). It is important to note that these advantages and disadvantages are not 
the main reasons to set-up a spinout; however, they still need to be considered by the 
parent firm when the decision to spin-out an internal project is made.  
The first potential advantage for the spinout venture is that they can avoid 
large overhead costs and bureaucratic decision making because they are typically 
organized as a relatively simple organization (Davenport et al., 2002; Ito, 1995; 
McElroy, 2003). In this way, they can work in a more agile way compared to the 
situation where a venture is part of a larger organization. Second, spinouts enjoy a 
high extent of independence that allows them to make their own decisions. In 
combination with the reduced level of bureaucracy this implies that the venture 
becomes highly flexible in changing its business model as it gains experience during 
its lifetime. Among other things, this enables the venture to directly and continuously 
incorporate learning from the market place in its modus operandi, and improves the 
speed of decision making (Jagersma and van Gorp, 2003).  
Third, previous research shows that ventures with corporate backing in terms 
of resources and assistance, perform relatively better than its standalone start-up 
counterparts (Chesbrough and Tucci, 2004; Ernst et al., 2005). For example, market 
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knowledge that the parent firm can provide to the spinout is valuable since this 
information is usually not easy to get and relatively expensive. Besides the offered 
resources and assistance the venture can benefit from the reputation of the parent 
organization. When potential customers and business partners see that a well 
established company is investing in a certain spinout, they might be more inclined to 
establish a business relationship with the spinout. 
As a final point, spinouts stimulate an entrepreneurial culture in which 
employees are more willing to take risks and feel ownership for the prosperity of the 
spinout venture (Chesbrough, 2003a). Often this entrepreneurial spirit is the single 
factor that is required to transform an innovative idea that was not thriving inside the 
parent organization into a successful spin-out business (Ledbetter and Zipkin, 2002).  
 Next to these four advantages for a spinout venture, two disadvantages can be 
identified. The first potential disadvantage for the spinout venture is that it can lose its 
access to several key infrastructures after it has been spun-out. Spinouts frequently 
have to cope with the loss of key infrastructures and borrowing these assets back from 
the parent organization is an efficient way of doing that (Govindarajan and Trimble, 
2005; McElroy, 2003). The second potential disadvantage for the spinout venture is 
that spinouts are often still kept too tight to the parent organization after they are 
spun-out, not allowing the spinout to reap the benefits of deciding on its own business 
model and creating its own core competencies and values (Lord et al., 2002). Hence, 
spinouts have to try to negotiate sufficient autonomy from their parent organizations 
to successfully create their own identity.   
 
---------- Insert table 2 about here ---------- 
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Besides the abovementioned advantages and disadvantages, previous research 
also identified several factors that enable the formation of spinouts. First, there should 
be an internal champion or sponsor that has sufficient political power inside the large 
established organization to stimulate spinouts by re-directing qualifying R&D output 
towards the set-up of a new external entity (Chesbrough, 2003a; Lord et al., 2002). 
Second, a corporate VC unit that can actively scout for potential R&D output in the 
internal organization that qualifies for a spinout venture is increasing the likelihood 
that a company establishes spinouts (Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b; Mason and Rohner, 
2002). CVC units that formally have the first rights when R&D output is rejected by 
the internal businesses can in this sense be complementary to, or even act as a 
replacement of the more informal role of a champion to re-direct R&D output to 
better paths to monetize the technology. Finally, inventors of the R&D output actively 
act as entrepreneurs to enable the monetization of their R&D output outside the parent 
organization (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Davenport et al., 2002).  
In sum, spinout success is defined in context of the upfront expectations of the net 
advantages a spinout will bring for the parent organization. The overview presented in 
tables 1 and 2 evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of spinouts for the parent 
organization and spinout management, creating a starting point for organizations 
about what can be expected when they spin-out internal R&D projects. This overview 
can guide organizations to make more informed decisions on whether or not to make 
use of spinouts as a strategic vehicle to commercialize their technology. Hence, the 
overview presented in tables 1 and 2 can be an important management asset for 
guiding relevant business decisions about spinouts.  
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How to successfully set-up a spinout  
After the decision is made to set-up a spinout, managers have to decide on the set-up 
characteristics and governance structure of the spinout venture. The exact set-up 
structure has to be agreed upon during the negotiations about the formal separation of 
the team working under the parent organization. However, organizations should be 
aware of the fact that the agreed upon structure remains dynamic and requires 
continuous negotiation and management over the lifetime of the spinout. In addition, 
it is recommended that an independent counsel guides these negotiations to best 
consider the interest of all parties (McElroy, 2003).  
The set-up phase of spinouts can be structured along five dimensions, i.e. 
product, market, people, finance and governance. Although the first four dimensions 
have been introduced in the context of technology ventures (Mason & Rohner, 2002), 
they have not yet been adopted in the context of spinouts. The governance dimension 
has to be added as it plays a crucial role given the interdependency in the parent-
spinout relation. We believe that these five dimensions create a basis for analyzing the 
set-up and management of spinouts in a more detailed way than the prevailing 
models. 
The first dimension entails different aspects related to the product or offering 
of the venture, including the product specifications, the delivery channels and the 
platform (next generations of the spinout’s product/service). The latter is important 
since high-technology products are often systems that consist of a set of 
interdependent complements building on specific platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002; Teece, 2007). Second, the market to be targeted by the spinout, and an 
appropriate sales and marketing strategy has to be identified. Paramount for making 
the right choices in this respect is that the spinout has access to sufficient information 
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about customers, competitors and suppliers  (Teece, 2007). Third, the financial picture 
has to be made insightful to all stakeholders, in order to secure funding. In this phase, 
parent organizations have to make sure that any investment round is performance-
based (Gompers, 2002; Mason and Rohner, 2002), and that the spinout's focus is 
incentivized to reduce the level of uncertainty of the initial cost and revenue estimates 
of the targeted markets.  
With respect to the people dimension, CEO, board and core venture teams 
have to be selected in coordination with the parent firm. For the spinout CEO 
position, there are valid arguments for selecting an internal or an external CEO (see 
Chesbrough 2003a), although it appears that in general external CEO's lead to a better 
spinout performance (Chesbrough, 2003b). Furthermore, the selection of the core 
team plays an important role; during this process it is important for the success of the 
venture to attract knowledge from outside the parent organization as a spinout works 
along the guidelines of a business model that is fundamentally different than the one 
of the parent organization (Mason and Rohner, 2002). In sum, external people play a 
vital role in the success of a spinout and they create value to the spinout venture if 
they complement the parent firm in terms of knowledge and experience.  
Another important element of the people dimension is the compensation of the 
venture's employees in terms of salary, equity or other financial benefits. First, 
financial rewards determine, to a great extent, the ability of the venture to attract high-
quality employees. In addition, employees are more motivated and committed to the 
venture's performance when they are offered part of the spin-out shares (Jagersma and 
van Gorp, 2003). Second, employees in spinout ventures often have to deal with high 
uncertainty and risk. This can be compensated by offering them the potential of 
relatively large stock option rewards (Timmons and Spinelli, 2004). Lastly, we have 
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to remember that external issues also have an impact on the offered compensation. 
For example the division of equity between the venture and its external investors will 
affect how much equity eventually is available to the team members (Timmons and 
Spinelli, 2004).   
Finally, for each spinout the most appropriate governance structure needs to 
be identified. In particular, the governance relationship between the spinout and the 
parent organization requires special attention. In general, successful governance 
consists of both formal and informal governance. As the formal side of governance 
contains issues as financial agreements, planning & control, hierarchy and conflict-
management procedures, the informal side is composed of leadership style, reputation, 
cultural differences, trust and values (De Man, 2006).  
Some scholars argue that the involvement of an outside venture capitalist firm 
(VC) is useful to improve the governance of the spinout venture, as these VC firms 
bring the "critical managerial and entrepreneurial expertise that is absent in most 
companies and public market institutional investors" (Ledbetter and Zipkin, 2002, p. 
341). Others give successful examples of CVC outfits that are governing a portfolio of 
spinouts in order to manage the strategic alignment with the parent organization. A 
third option is to have the portfolio of spinouts under management by a venture 
business office, which owns the equity stake instead of the business units, in order to 
protect the ventures from "corporate anti-bodies" (Mason and Rohner, 2002). In any 
case, it is wise for a parent organization to choose a governance model that protects 
the strategic interest of the parent organization in the ventures, while at the same time 
introduces professionalism and a latitude – but effective – form of control. Practice 
has shown that many organizations that successfully make use of spinouts use a CVC 
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unit that acts as a hybrid between a private VC and an internal business development 
unit to govern their spinouts (Ernst et al., 2005).  
 
How to successfully manage a spinout 
When the venture is established, the parent firm and the spinout venture 
should furthermore cope with the spinout management. Here it is important to note 
that reconfiguration of the initial set-up dimensions is one of the most essential 
spinout management functions. This is based on the idea that during the different 
phases of the spinout's lifetime the technological and market uncertainty reduce and as 
a consequence the venture needs to constantly manage and refine its strategic 
direction (Davenport et al., 2002). To achieve the proper strategic direction and 
enhance both the venture's internal and external fitness continuous management 
efforts to build, maintain, and reconfigure the necessary resources are required 
(Teece, 2007). An ongoing relationship with the parent organization can be one of the 
main sources for the spinout to gain access to these needed resources at a relatively 
low cost (Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005; McElroy, 2003; Rothaermel, 2001). 
Especially customer relationships, distribution channels, supply networks, brands, 
credibility, manufacturing capacity and expertise in technologies are resources that 
can be borrowed from the parent organization (Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005). It 
can thus be concluded that systematic management of spinouts has much to do with 
making well-informed decisions to adjust the initial set-up dimensions of the spinout - 
often enabled by resources the spinout sources from its parent - and less with daily 
management of the spinout.  
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 The parent organization has of course its own reasons to have an ongoing 
relationship with its spinouts, which are also related to the changing nature of 
technological and market uncertainty. Especially in a business environment 
characterized by rapid, complex and radical technological changes, uncertainty is very 
high. Under these circumstances, the parent firm needs to respond in a flexible way 
and investing in spinouts is a possibility for the parent firm to explore newly emerging 
technologies or business opportunities. Over time, by continuously monitoring the 
spinout, the parent firm will get an improved understanding of the business 
opportunities stemming from the new technology. Eventually, it has the option to 
spin-in the venture when uncertainty drops to an acceptable level assuming that the 
parent firm becomes sufficiently familiar with the technology and the venture proves 
to be commercially viable (Van de Vrande, Lemmens en Vanhaverbeke, 2006).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Setting 
In the case-study section of this article we analyze the managerial practice by 
looking at Avantium, an innovative company that was spun-out of Shell – a large oil 
& gas multinational – in early 2000. The spinout currently (December 2009) employs 
about 100 people and targets the R&D experimentation market. Avantium provides 
customers with high-throughput experimentation services that allow customers to 
speed-up their R&D, it sells complete research system tools and also manages its own 
portfolio of drugs and biofuels intellectual property. During its first years Avantium 
developed the core elements of its advanced high-throughput experimentation 
processes by investing significant resources to upgrade the technology it inherited 
from Shell, which founded the basis for high-throughput testing. This included 
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investments in sub-technologies such as the 10-9 scale parallel catalyst-testing 
platform, technology for heterogeneous catalysis research and parallel batch reactors 
and catalyst preparation robotics technology. Furthermore, new systems and 
associated software were developed to create a fully integrated process for high-
throughput experimentation. Since 2003 the spinout realized it needed a stronger 
focus in its approach, and converged its attention on catalysis research for the 
chemical- and oil industries and on crystallization research for the pharmaceutical 
industry. In the spinouts first years collaborations and partnerships with industry 
partners were a key value driver in the company’s approach to grow. In 2005 
Avantium started with the sales of research system tools, and – to indicate the success 
of the spinout’s partnership strategy – by the end of the year Avantium had formed 
partnerships with some 40 of the world's major chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
companies. In 2006 the company initiated its own program for developing new drugs 
and biofuels. All these developments made Avantium a profitable company since 
2007, and stable growth was achieved since then. In less than a decade the company 
had established itself as a leading player in the technology services market. 
 
Rationale for approach  
Because of the absence of any previous systematic research about the setup 
and the subsequent management of a spinout, we consider it essential to adopt a 
qualitative approach to our inquiry (Lee, 1999). Furthermore, a qualitative research 
design involving a case-study is appropriate since scholars have shown that it is well 
suited for analyzing dynamic processes (Lee, 1999) and the object of study requires 
observation in its context (Yin, 1994). In particular, we adopt the “theory elaboration" 
approach, which serves to extend theory in cases where "preexisting conceptual ideas 
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or a preliminary model drives the study design" (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999: 
164).  
On the basis of these principles we started writing a case history based on 
corporate documents, and observational and interview data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
1994). We triangulated data by using all data sources available, focusing on insights 
that were supported by multiple data sources and confirmed by several interviewees 
(Jick, 1979).We also followed-up with emails and/or calls to fill-in missing data or to 
check insufficiently supported insights with interviewees when necessary. This led to 
an initial version of the case study. After sharing the draft case study with some 
interviewees for validation, we engaged in iterations between draft case study, the  
interview output and spinout literature until a coherent story emerged.  
 
Data Sources and Analysis 
The details of the case-study have been achieved through the use of several 
data sources: (1) corporate archives, including publications, announcements and 
business plans at both the spinout and parent organization, (2) repeated semi-
structured interviews with managers of the parent organization that were involved in 
the spin-out process, (3) repeated semi-structured interviews with executives at the 
spinout, (4) follow-ups with emails, phone calls and transcripts of interviews to 
validate initial findings with managers and executives at both the parent organization 
and spinout.  
 A key data source for obtaining insights about the spinout were the semi-
structured interviews with managers and executives at both the parent organization 
and spinout. For this particular case study we interviewed people both directly 
involved in the spin-out of Avantium, and parent organization executives with 
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insights in the technology strategy, spin-out rationale and policy. Over a period of 14 
months – between November 2007 and December 2008 - multiple interviews were 
conducted with five types of interviewees: 1) CEO and Management Team of the 
spinout, 2) technology experts of the spinout, 3) senior business development 
managers of the parent organization, 4) R&D managers at the parent organization 
laboratory linked with the spinout 5) technology incubators at the parent organization. 
These interviews ranged from 90 to 180 minutes. Although interviews were held with 
a diverse set of people involved in Avantium as sources for the case-study, all 
interviews roughly followed the order of phases in the lifetime of a spinout. First the 
interviewees were asked to focus on the spinout decision, and then the interview 
gradually moved towards the negotiation phase. After that the set-up and later 
management phases of the spinout were discussed. As the interviews were only semi-
structured these phases of the interviews were guided by certain standardized 
questions. However there was always space for the interviewees to go deeper into 
certain topics they were most acquainted with, or bring-up new elements and 
divergent views. Typically the set-up and management phases were discussed along 
the elements of the classification of set-up  and management dimensions, as 
introduced by this article (product, market, people, finance, governance). This proved 
to be a useful way to discuss topics with the interviewees, and also served as a 
guideline to explore new topics. Depending if the interviewees were, or were not, 
involved with Avantium in certain phases of its lifetime, certain elements of the 
interview were trimmed down or even left out. 
Furthermore it needs to be mentioned that since our case-based approach 
resulted in situations in which interviewees were reflecting on periods that could be as 
far as nine to ten years back, this had implications for the data validation methods we 
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used. As said before, this case-study used a policy in which before concluding a 
certain finding could be interpreted as accurate with reasonable certainty, it needed to 
be underpinned with another source pointing in the same direction (Jick, 1979). This 
came down to using data triangulation as described earlier, and in practice often 
meant going through documents such as a Business Plan or other formalized 
agreements, to underpin a statement. Nevertheless did the use of retrospective data-
gathering have consequences for the risk of biased views being included our case 
study. More information about this issue and other consequences of the chosen 
research methodology can be found in the Limitations section of this paper. 
 
Procedure 
We started by identifying factors relevant for achieving spinout success, as 
scholars researching spinouts have not yet settled on an overview. Thereafter, our aim 
was to examine if all identified factors relevant for the successful set-up of a spinout 
could be captured in a practical applied assessment model including the five 
dimensions we discussed in the previous section. The model provided a systematic 
approach to decide about when to spin out a project and how to successfully set-up 
and manage the spinout process. Now, theory will be elaborated by applying the 
model to a case study regarding the spin-out of Avantium, which was spun-out of 
Royal Dutch Shell. The setting of this case is in our opinion appropriate for several 
reasons. Firstly, the relationship between the parent (a large multinational, with great 
technical reputation) and the spinout (working on a niche product not deemed relevant 
enough by the parent organization) is a common case for spinouts. Secondly, the 
market targeted by the spinout (high-throughput experimentation) consists of 
competitors varying largely in size, so the performance of the spinout due to the set-
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up decisions and management interventions can be viewed in the context of a 
reasonably mature market with different types of competitors. Learning’s from the 
spinout’s set-up and management over time are to be discussed and interpreted, 
illustrating how to setup and manage a spinout in a systematic way. 
 
MODELLING THE SPINOUT PROCESS 
A model for the set-up and subsequent management of a spinout 
The model in Figure 1 captures the crucial dimensions in the assessment of the 
establishment and subsequent management of a corporate spinout. The model depicts 
how Shell de-facto uses a stepwise system for the decision making (phase 0) when 
deciding about a potential spinout, which can be integrated with subsequent phases 
that are able to analyze the spin-out process of the venture itself (phase 1) and the set-
up and management of a spinout (phase 2). This model, introduced by the authors, 
reflects best-practices at Shell to decide on-, set-up and manage spinouts. It can be of 
use for both academia and practitioners when looking at spinouts. In its core it reflects 
two key points. Firstly, that successful spinouts need to be created with an end-goal in 
mind (phase 0), and spun-out fast and fair (phase 1). Secondly, that in order to create 
successful spinouts all of the spinout elements (the authors have defined a 
categorization in five dimensions) need to be set-up and over time managed 
successful (phase 2). In that sense the model treats a spinout as a ongoing process of 
enacting set-ups, rather than static event. Below follows a quick description of the 
different phases of the model, in the context of the spin-out of Avantium. 
Phase 0 of the model focuses on the venture at the time it was still an internal 
innovation project at Shell. During that phase it became progressively clear that the 
project (which was later on spun out as Avantium) could no longer be developed 
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within the company. Hence, in this phase the parent company decides whether the 
venture can continue as an internal project, whether it has to be spun out, or whether 
another external path to market has to be chosen. The different strategic advantages 
for a parent organization to spin-out the venture are mentioned in Figure 1 and reflect 
the advantages that have been listed in Table 1. These advantages for the parent 
organization can be divided into two subgroups (technology monetization advantages 
and strategic advantages related to innovation management), and are compared by 
Shell during phase 0 with the parental disadvantages for a spinout, next to secondary 
points about the pros and cons for the spinout venture itself. 
Phase 1 covers the negotiation process of the spinout of Avantium. This is a 
key phase for the successful set-up of a spinout; achieving fair and balanced outcomes 
as well as speed of negotiation are critical in this phase.  
In Phase 2 the spinout management has to determine how they will set-up and 
manage the spinout. We identified 5 dimensions that are crucial to successfully set-up 
a new spinout. They are applied to Avantium’s set-up phase and we will discuss them 
in detail below. Finally the model shows how the set-up and management of a spinout 
- including strategic interventions over time – determine how successful the spinout 
becomes, and thus also determine the degree of success the parent organization has in 
pursuing its strategic objectives identified in Phase 0.     
 
---------- Insert figure 1 about here ---------- 
With this model of the spinout process in mind, we can now return to the start 
of this innovative company; a research initiative that started within a R&D group 
working on developing new technologies for Shell. 
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Phase 0 : Strategic decision to spin-out a venture 
The first generation of the technology commercialized by Avantium was invented 
and further improved by the catalyst R&D group at Shell between 1994 and 2000, 
with the aim to faster de-risk and deploy new catalysts. From 1998 to 2000, a 
visionary R&D leader who can be considered as the key inventor of the technology 
led this catalyst R&D group. The first experiments with the new technology for high-
throughput experimentation showed great contribution to an improved speed for 
deploying new catalysts. However, it became also clear that large investments were 
needed to develop the technology further, including investments in robot technology 
and experimentation software. The need for large R&D investments, especially in 
areas in which Shell was not traditionally strong, were considered a key blocker for 
the future of this project in Shell’s R&D portfolio. The project leader for the internal 
project realized the need for large investments and technical and commercial expertise 
in traditional non-Shell industries. This made the project suitable for a broadly 
supported spinout, because of its ability to attract external investments, while at the 
same time allowing shareholders with relevant technical and commercial backgrounds 
to join in. After some discussion the project leader was given six months by Shell to 
find interested parties that not only would invest as shareholders in the new spinout, 
but also would serve as its first guaranteed customers. Soon after, the project leader 
found a set of interested parties that met the demands of Shell, and in the following 
months Shell decided that a spinout was the preferred way to take the project further. 
In conclusion, Shell decided in 2000 to spin-out this internal venture based on 3 of 
the 10 strategic reasons that we identified in Table 1: 
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• To attain a more efficient governance model  
• To create future synergies with Shell’s current products/ services  
• To achieve strategic coherence within Shell’s portfolio of R&D investments 
 
The first strategic reason for creating a spinout was that a spinout was 
considered as a more efficient way to develop high throughput experimentation 
technology for Shell. Deploying the technology through a spinout allowed attracting 
external investment through other industry partners that would also bring in relevant 
technical experience. A spinout would furthermore be able to work on a much lower 
cost-basis - mainly due to reduced bureaucracy – which allowed Shell to 
commercialize this technology more efficiently than it would if the technology would 
be commercialized in-house.  
The second strategic reason to choose for a spinout compared to other 
alternatives was that the outcomes coming from this project could still be very 
interesting for Shell, in the sense that catalyst-testing innovations by its nature had the 
potential of creating synergies with Shell’s R&D developments in the catalyst 
business. As a result, Shell had an incentive to ensure that this technology was further 
developed by an entity with which it could maintain some sort of technology 
“Looking back at the rationale to spin-out Avantium, in summary Shell decided to 
set-up a spinout because it was a more efficient governance structure, Avantium could 
over time create synergies with Shell’s businesses and Shell could maintain its strategic 
coherence by externalizing a research project that did not match our overall strategic 
direction.” 
    Dr. Jan van der Eijk 
Chief Technology Officer RDS (2006-2009) 
     November 2008.  
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development relationship and create synergies for its internal experimentation 
capacity.  
The third strategic reason in favor of a spinout was that a spinout allowed 
Shell to adhere to a strong strategic coherence in its R&D portfolio. The product of 
Avantium was something Shell was very interested in as a customer for its catalyst 
business, but not as an owner of the business as it required expertise and competing in 
typical non-Shell industries. Creating a spinout, where multiple shareholders would 
own the technology, allowed Shell to refocus its R&D resources on projects more 
directly linked to the Oil & Gas industry, and focus more on its role as a customer in 
the high-throughput experimentation market. This also allowed the new venture 
freedom to enter in markets where Shell was not active (e.g. testing new drugs for 
pharmaceutical). As a consequence the spinout could use the technology for 
monetization in non-Shell related applications and markets and hence achieve a 
stronger commercial basis and over time become technologically more advanced than 
an internal venture.  
 
Phase 1: Negotiating the spin-out process 
Because of the three reasons mentioned above Shell managers concluded to 
give the current project leader of the internal R&D project six months to look for 
interested parties for creating a spinout. The aim was to find interested parties that not 
only would invest as shareholders in a spinout, but also could serve as its first 
guaranteed customers. This was a hard condition for Shell, as this would assure the 
continuity of any Shell investment in a spinout. In the following months, the project 
leader found a set of interested parties, and it was decided that a spinout was the 
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preferred governance mode for the further development of this technology. The 
interested parties that would turn into the new shareholders of the spinout were 
multinationals like Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline and Royal Dutch Shell. Also, institutes 
like Delft University of Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology and the 
University of Twente were founding parties of the new spinout. Once interested 
parties were found, Shell started the negotiations with them for transferring the IP to a 
spinout. 
The negotiations with the consortium of companies and universities about the 
conditions under which the IP would be transferred to the spinout company went 
smoothly. Within six months all interested parties were aligned and the different 
partners agreed upon the term sheets. All IP transfer documents were signed after 
another quarter and the set-up of the new spinout could begin. This success in 
establishing a spinout in such a short time – a critical factor in this phase – was 
achieved because a professional external party (an investment bank) took the lead in 
drafting all legal and commercial terms. Based on this experience it became best 
practice for Shell to use investment banks to guide spin-out negotiations.  
 
“Although Avantium’s spin-out was not done by Shell’s corporate venturing arm 
Shell Technology Ventures (STV Fund 1 B.V.), a clear best practice applied by the 
company was the guidance of the spin-out out of Shell and the negotiations of terms under 
which this happened by an investment bank. In our experience this helps greatly in 
achieving fair outcomes and a speedy process.” 
     Erik Vollebregt 
Managing Director STV (2001-current) 
      April 2008.  
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The negotiated terms during the spin-out process were regarded fair in terms 
of the commercial, legal and IP arrangements for all parties involved – including the 
parent organization Shell and the newly formed spinout company. The only problem 
that originated from the spin-out negotiations was that during the six months no 
formal agreements were signed regarding the volume of the mandatory orders the 
companies' shareholders in the consortium would make; only informal targets were 
agreed upon. This was a clear learning point for the parent organization, because as a 
consequence Avantium faced considerable uncertainty about future income streams 
during its first years. An assessment of the spin-out process of Avantium is 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
 
Phase 2: Set-up and management of a spinout 
The set-up and management phase of Avantium can best be analyzed on the 
basis of a model consisting of five key dimensions we identified earlier, i.e. product, 
market, people, finance, and governance, which is created by elaborating on the 
insights of different scholars. Most notably the dimensions product, market, people, 
finance are derived from a Corporate Venture Capital context (see Mason & Rohner, 
2002) and the governance dimension is added to this by the authors of this article as 
this dimension is especially paramount given the nature of the special spinout/parent 
relationship (Lord et al, 2002, Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005; McElroy, 2003).This 
phase succeeds the successful spin-out negotiations with interested parties. It however 
also relates to the strategic decision phase, as high-level decisions in the set-up and 
management phase determine to what degree the strategic advantages the parent 
organization strives for are achieved. For the purpose of this study we focus on the 
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higher-level set-up decisions and subsequent strategic management interventions. 
Hence, day-to-day interventions and tactical management of the spinout are for that 
reason excluded from the overview presented in this phase.  This section will describe 
the strengths, weaknesses and strategic interventions of the five key set-up and 
management dimensions by Avantium’s management, which are summarized in Table 
4.  
 
---------- Insert Table 4 about here ---------- 
 
The product dimension was set-up relatively successful by Avantium, mainly 
thriving on the strengths of the inherited IP. Firstly, the technical characteristics and 
advantages of the products and services commercialized by the spinout led to a strong 
competitive position. Secondly, future income-streams based on the initial IP were 
already identified during the set-up phase. This enabled a successfully executed 
diversification strategy during the period 2003-2007.  
 
On the other hand, a weakness of the original set-up was the initial lack of a 
focused technology strategy to create an even stronger competitive position by further 
“The quality of the IP that Avantium inherited from Shell was excellent, and 
helped us to build-up a strong, competitive offering. Probably out of excitement about the 
possibilities of our IP, many applications to commercialize Avantium’s technology were 
intensively explored in our first years of existence.” 
     Dr. Chris John 
Principal Scientist Avantium (2005-2008) 
      May 2008.  
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reducing technical risks. Spinouts usually burn cash on explorative R&D during the 
first months and years after their establishment in order to generate the technical 
knowledge needed to define a technology strategy. However, Avantium was already 
developing its technology as an internal project within Shell for six years (1994-2000) 
and the appointed CEO of Avantium was also the project leader when the project was 
running inside Shell.  The absence of a clear technology strategy in the first years of 
the company led to a relative high cash burn rate as too many technical applications 
were explored at the same time. Later on, the spinout management coped with this 
lack of focus. Avantium’s current CEO, who took control over the company in 2005, 
made a simple and focused technology strategy his primary focus in the first months 
of his tenure. This, in turn, alleviated part of the company’s initial hunger for cash. 
 
With regard to the market dimension a different story unfolded during the set-
up of Avantium. Key marketing aspects such as clear sales and marketing strategy -
reflected in a business plan that sets achievable and motivating targets to guide stable 
growth - was initially not of primary concern for the company. Only the marketing 
towards current investors was well established and led to large investment from its 
shareholders – something that was also needed to facilitate the relative high cash-burn 
rate in the company’s first years. The business plans used for attracting finance rounds 
“When I became CEO in 2005 it was my key priority was to further rationalize 
expenditure and bring focus in our approach to commercialize the IP. The business plans 
used up to that point were visionary, but often lacked commercial grounding. It was time 
for Avantium to become a more mature and commercially competitive company.” 
     Tom van Aken 
CEO Avantium (2005-current) 
      June 2008.  
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can by hindsight called visionary at best, but were certainly not realistic in terms of 
growth expectations at that time. It can thus be concluded that the commercial focus 
of the spinout was initially very low. This is illustrated by the fact that only in 2002 – 
two full years after the start of the spinout – Avantium hired its first commercial 
employees. Re-adjustment of the initial set-up of the market dimension was 
something that happened slowly but steadily between 2002 and 2004. The change 
materialized first by attracting more people with a commercial background into the 
company, and second by allowing a VC to enter as a key shareholder of the spinout in 
2003. These interventions led to an increased commercial focus by means of a proper 
sales and marketing strategy. This renewed focus on the market dimensions gradually 
improved the financial results of the venture and in 2005 the spinout became 
profitable for the first time. 
 In terms of setting-up of the people dimension, Avantium again did relatively 
well. Firstly, the spinout’s new board was successfully recruited, and consisted of 
people with relevant, complementary fields of expertise, which enabled the successful 
interventions described in this study. Secondly, recruiting employees for the spinout 
went well as the technology focus and Shell-reputation provided a strong employee 
value proposition, and enabled the spinout to attract world-class researchers. Thirdly, 
Avantium’s appointed CEO had much knowledge of technology and was extremely 
charismatic, but he had limited commercial skills. Another, more commercially 
oriented CEO was selected from Avantium's internal ranks in 2005. He effectively 
addressed the issue of Avantium’s high cash burn rate and poor commercial focus. 
Fourthly, ten secondees were attracted by the spinout from Shell under a general 
agreement that fostered initial progress – especially in the product dimension – but 
over time also indirectly lowered the entrepreneurial spirit in the spinout. This was 
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due to the fact that this relative large sub-group within Avantium did not face the 
same entrepreneurial uncertainty that the rest of the spinout experienced. Hence, it 
was decided in 2004 that all ten employees under the Shell-secondment agreement 
should make a choice to either start working under the same conditions as Avantium 
staff did, or leave the company. Only one employee working under the secondment-
agreement took the offer and remained employed by Avantium. 
 In setting-up the finance dimension of the spinout, Avantium achieved a 
mixed set of results. Firstly, in terms of securing capital, sufficient financial means for 
further de-risking of the technology and new business development was obtained 
through financing rounds. This is a key hurdle to take for any new venture, and 
Avantium passed this milestone with honors.  However, this in turn also led to a 
situation in which the spinout management was tempted to opt for a very aggressive – 
and thus also more expensive – growth strategy. Although the aggressive growth 
schedule was never realized, there also needs to be articulated that the decision was 
taken in a time (2000, 2001) in which VC firm backed technology companies boomed 
as never before. On the other hand there still can be concluded that budgetary 
prudence and strict financial controls in order to monitor and control expenditure were 
not in place, which are two elements that facilitated Avantium’s initial excessive cash 
burn rate. A key strategic intervention in the finance dimension can be pinpointed to 
2003, after which gradually more and more financial prudence was introduced, and 
financial monitoring processes were introduced and strictly applied. Furthermore, a 
downsize of the spinout in 2005 (roughly 25% of employees were made redundant) 
was successfully executed to conclude efforts to achieve an operating mode with a 
much stronger commercial basis.  
 32
 
Finally, the governance dimension of Avantium was initially set-up quite 
poorly, but got high priority in the strategic interventions in the years thereafter. 
Directly after its set-up the governance relationship between Shell as parent 
organization and the spinout led to some benefits for Avantium in the form of 
borrowing technical expertise through Shell-seconded employees, next to legal and 
safety related advice in the early years of the company (2000-2004). The governance 
relationship between the consortium of shareholders and the spinout worked out less 
successful in the first years of the spinout. After concluding the negotiation phase the 
consortium of shareholders was represented in a large board that was governing 
Avantium. Within this governance body it soon became clear that it was hard to align 
the different views, partly because there were initially many shareholders invited in 
the consortium owning the spinout. This led to a reduced feeling of ownership for 
Avantium’s success by the (many) shareholders, and tensions between shareholders 
due to diverging expectations. As a consequence a lack of focus in the technical and 
commercial direction occurred, as every shareholder had slightly different objectives 
with the spinout. Another issue was that the governance relationship with Shell did 
not lead to business deals between the parent organization and spinout or the 
establishment of any form of active sponsorship of the technology commercialized by 
Avantium. After the first years of business Avantium focused on the adaptation of the 
“When spinouts mature, financial controls to monitor and control expenditures are 
becoming more important. Since the 2003, step by step more financial prudence and 
control was introduced at Avantium.”   
     Frank Roerink 
CFO Avantium (2007-current) 
      November 2008. 
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initial set-up decisions in the governance dimension which led to much stronger 
governance. 
  
More specifically, several financing rounds took place during the period 2003-
2007, in which many of the original stakeholders (including Shell) phased out their 
stake in Avantium, while others used these opportunities to increase their stake. In 
2003 also a VC firm used these financing rounds to obtain a significantly large stake 
in Avantium; a step that strongly helped the spinout to become more commercially 
oriented and financially disciplined. Over time these financing rounds led to a much 
smaller group of shareholders, and hence increased uniformity of shareholder 
expectations, which in its turn eased the governance of the spinout. Finally, strategic 
interventions from Avantium’s management and renewed initiatives from both Shell 
as parent organization and Avantium led to much stronger ties between the two 
organizations. In 2007, Shell became a main customer of the technology services and 
products commercialized by its spinout. 
 
“The governance relationship between the consortium of shareholders and 
Avantium did not work successful in the first years of our existence. This was a clear focus 
area for me when I took over as CEO. Both the invitation of a Venture Capital firm and 
Avantium as a consequence of the financing rounds having less shareholders helped us to 
resolve the complicated governance structure that was inherited from our initial set-up.” 
     Tom van Aken 
CFO Avantium (2005-current) 
      November 2008. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Spinouts are becoming increasingly popular among large industrial companies 
as an external path to market for technologies that do not fit into the corporate growth 
strategy. The literature is relatively silent about how to spin out a venture 
successfully, despite the apparent popularity of spinouts among large industrial 
corporations. Evidence is scattered and based on a few case studies. In this study, we 
provided a model to decide on, set up and manage a spin out. The spinout model 
underlines the requirement to connect the strategic rationale for a spin-out by the 
parent organization – as discussed in-depth in the theory section – with the more 
practical negotiation-, set-up and management phases of the spinout. 
This study contributes in different ways to our current understanding of the 
spin out process. Firstly, it creates a coherent overview of advantages and 
disadvantages of using spinouts in a strategic way as an alternative to internal 
innovation projects to valorize and monetize the commercial potential of a 
technology. Analyzing the condition under which monetizing technology through 
spinouts is superior to internal paths to the market have thus far not received a lot of 
attention in the literature (Klepper, 2009).   
Secondly, the phased approach shows the critical steps that have to be taken 
by actors in the decision, set-up and management phases of a spinout. The model we 
use provides a structured approach to decide about when to spin out a project and 
how to manage the negotiation, set-up and management phases. We have illustrated 
how the model works applying it to one of Royal Dutch Shell’s spinouts. The model 
has shown that a staged approach is important to structure the spin-out process: It 
creates a platform to discuss key success factors of current and future spinouts in any 
VC or corporate portfolio. The analysis of the spinout process into a selection, 
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transfer, set-up, and management phase led to the creation of an assessment 
methodology to analyze spinouts that can be generically applied and easily depicted 
in a visual format. Such an assessment model has not been offered before in the 
literature on spinouts. 
Moreover, the 5 dimensions in the set-up phase are critical in setting up and 
managing a spinout in its first years. We have illustrated this for Avantium, a spinout 
of Royal Dutch Shell, but it is beyond doubt that each spinout can benefit from 
carefully implementing the 5 dimensions in a systematic way after it is established. 
Although spinouts might benefit from its corporate parent after it is established, it is 
nevertheless critical that it focuses on its own managerial challenges. A closer look at 
the 5 dimensions also reveals that the spinout DNA may still be too much a reflection 
of its parent’s DNA. As most spinouts stem from an internal R&D project in large 
corporations, they frequently have a strong technology push focus – this was also the 
case in Avantium. A systematic analysis of the 5 dimensions would have revealed 
that Avantium’s strategic direction was too much technical oriented and that the 
range of applications was too broad. The subsequent strategic interventions corrected 
these management problems, but they could have been avoided if the shareholders – 
including Shell – carefully implemented the 5 dimensions in the set-up stage. 
 
Managerial implications 
This study offers managers a relatively simple model that can be systematically 
applied in practice. In doing so we have provided managers with a phased approach 
showing the critical steps that have to be taken in the decision, set-up and 
management phases of a spinout. With respect to the decision phase, research shows 
that spin-out success is determined by carefully weighing the various advantages and 
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disadvantages and then making conscious decisions about valorizing and monetizing 
the commercial potential of a technology by means of a spinout. As such, the 
overview discussed in our paper can be an important source for managers who are 
guiding business decisions on whether or not to spin out. Looking at the set-up and 
management phases, it is argued by Siegel et al. (2007) that most attention has been 
focused on spinout creation and not on their further development into a sustainable 
venture. As spinouts become more popular we expect managers not only to set-up but 
also manage spinouts in a highly structured way, thereby enhancing the development 
of sustainable ventures. 
 Finally, given that an assessment model of the spinout process has not been 
created before in scholarly literature, our study helps managers to develop insights 
with respect to the necessary practices and mechanisms needed to carry out the 
different phases effectively. Implementing the model (including the 5 dimensions) can 
enhance management's capability to increase the likelihood of successful spinouts 
thereby creating an important complement to their internal innovation model.  
 
Limitations and future research 
The contributions of this paper also come with limitations, which should be kept in 
mind. Firstly, there should be noted that an individual spinout-case is useful for 
establishing an overview of the issues faced by the spinout, and provide a good 
starting point for a discussion, but should not be mistaken for a precise measurement 
of performance, as only two categories (positive or negative) are used to qualify the 
different management challenges. This quantification should not be considered as a 
formal rating or assessment of the spinout. Future analyses can quantify the rating of 
the management challenges.  
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 Secondly, the solutions created on basis of all gathered insights are specific to 
Shell and Avantium and should, as a consequence not be uniformly transferred to 
other situations, without considering the specific context for which these solutions are 
created, such as the type of industry, the reasons for Shell to create spinouts, the type 
of relationship between Shell and its spinouts and the presence of a CVC unit.  
 Thirdly, as aforementioned in the Methodology section, the case-study of 
Avantium is created by reconstruction of corporate history on the basis of 
documentation and via semi-structured interviews. As a consequence the conclusions 
and best practices on how to set-up and manage a spinout, as derived from rich data in 
the case study of Avantium, can only be seen as hypothesis-generating at best. 
However, the goal of the case-study was not to aim for achieving most scientific rigor, 
but to generate hypotheses on how to set-up manage a spinout over time. Furthermore, 
the case study also was provided a real-life assessment of the spinout model 
introduced by the authors, and how it can be applied to both reviewing and learning 
from former spinouts, and proactively managing and assessing current spinouts.  
 Finally, we focused on a narrow set of management challenges leaving out  
many other issues that will pop up during the spinout management process. For 
instance, we did not analyze in detail other external paths to the market such as 
licensing or selling technology to other large companies. Next, to keep the analysis 
tractable we did not analyze in detail the role of the (syndication of) venture 
capitalists that invest in the spinout: a full blown analysis requires that their objectives 
are included in the overall management equation.  
This study also allows us to identify areas for further research. Firstly, more research 
can be conducted on the internal project phase of spinouts, as the characteristics of 
internal projects in this phase before the actual spin-out are likewise to have 
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explanatory power in determining the value of a spin-out; for instance, the presence of  
strongly motivated, charismatic internal project leaders at internal projects of Shell is 
one of the critical success factors of the spinouts. Secondly, more attention should be 
paid at the interesting finding that indirect and longer-term strategic advantages to use 
spinouts seem not to be considered by parent organizations that use an ad-hoc, 
opportunity driven spinout process.  
Next, more attention should be paid to the observation that at technology-oriented 
parent organizations the management of a spinout tends to have a strong focus on the 
technical product capabilities and the interrelated technology de-risking strategy, 
negatively influencing commercial success of the spinout. Finally, more research is 
needed to produce validated insights why exactly spinouts can be used as an 
alternative to the internal paths to market to monetization of firm’s technology. This 
type of research would be of vital importance for many large industrial companies that 
intend to use spinouts as a strategic vehicle to monetize technology.  
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Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of setting-up spinouts for the parent 
organization.  
Advantage Source 
1. Spinouts are used to speed up the internal 
innovation cycle 
Chesbrough (2003a, 2003b) 
2. Spinouts are used to stimulate an 
entrepreneurial culture 
Block & Macmillan (1993), Ito 
(1995), Chesbrough (2003a, 2003b) 
3. Spinouts are used as it is a valuable 
experience for managers 
Ito (1995), McElroy (2003) 
4. Spinouts are used for recruitment and to 
retain researchers 
Chesbrough (2003a), McElroy (2003) 
5. Spinouts are used for efficient governance Burgelman et al. (2004), Ito (1995), 
McElroy (2003) 
6. Spinouts are used to pursue disruptive 
technologies 
Burgelman et al. (2004), Christensen 
(1997), Drucker (1974), Gompers 
(2002) 
7. Spinouts are used to create strategic 
coherence 
Burgelman et al. (2004), Chesbrough 
(2003a, 2003b), Ito (1995), McElroy 
(2003) 
8. Spinouts are used to explore potential 
future markets  
Chesbrough (2003a), Dahlstrand 
(1997), McElroy (2003) 
9. Spinouts are used to create synergies with 
the parent firm's products or services 
Iansiti and Levien (2004) 
10. Spinouts are used as a final option to 
monetize technology 
Chesbrough (2003a, 2003b), Ledbetter 
& Zipkin (2002), McElroy (2003) 
Disadvantage  Source 
1. Spinouts often fail (for various reasons) Lord et al. (2002), McElroy (2003)  
2. Spinouts can hollow out the parent 
organization 
Davenport et al. (2002) 
3. Spinouts make choices which are 
unbeneficial for the parent  
Chesbrough (2003a) 
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Table 2. Advantages and disadvantages of setting-up spinouts for the spinout venture. 
Advantage Source 
1. Spinouts decrease the level of 
overheads and bureaucracy 
Davenport et al. (2002), Ito (1995), 
McElroy (2003) 
2. Spinouts allow a different business 
model 
Chesbrough (2003a), McElroy (2003) 
3. Spinouts stimulate a strong 
entrepreneurial culture.  
Davenport et al. (2002), Ito (1995), 
Ledbtter and Zipkin (2002), McElroy 
(2003) 
4. Spinouts benefit from corporate 
backing in terms of resources, assistance 
and reputation.  
Chesbrough and Tucci (2004), Ernst et al. 
(2005) 
Disadvantage Source 
1. Spinouts can lose key infrastructures Govindarajan and Trimble (2005),  
McElroy (2003)  
2. Spinouts can be kept too tight to the 
parent 
Lord et al. (2002), McElroy (2003) 
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Table 3. Spinout process assessment of Avantium 
Dimension  Assessment ( positive / neutral / negative ) 
Negotiation +: The spin-out process went smoothly, within 9 months partners 
were selected and terms negotiated  
Negotiation + : Negotiated spin-out terms were fair regarding IP sale, licensing 
fees and legal protection for the parent organization, spinout 
shareholders and spinout 
Negotiation - : Informal Agreements on spinout partners shareholders to act as 
guaranteed customers were not formally formalized 
Negotiation - : Too many spinout shareholders were selected, causing problems 
in the governance dimension due to diverse expectations. 
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Table 4. Set-up assessment of Avantium 
Dimension  Assessment ( positive / neutral / negative ) 
Product + : IP characteristics and technology led to a strong competitive 
position. Technical characteristics and advantages of product led to a 
strong competitive position 
Product  + : Successors and future income-streams based on the original 
technology identified 
Product - : Initially the company had a low focus on a specific technology 
direction to create a stronger competitive position  
Product 
(2003) 
Clear technology strategy created, focusing on technology de-risking 
in specific technical areas 
Market + : Visionary business plan created that appealed to shareholders and 
attracted sufficient funds 
Market - : Commercial capabilities  of the spinout stayed underdeveloped 
during its first years 
Market - : Business plan was not realistic in terms of growth targets and stated 
expectations 
Market 
(2002) 
Structural recruitment of commercial employees to improve sales & 
marketing capabilities 
Market 
(2003) 
Awareness of low commercial capabilities led to aim for including a 
VC as shareholder 
People + : Appointed board consisted of people with relevant, complementary 
fields of expertise, enabling successful interventions 
People + : Recruitment of staff went well, as having a technology focus and 
Shell-reputation attracted high-quality researchers 
People - : Initial CEO had much knowledge of technology and was very 
charismatic, but had little commercial focus / skills 
People - : Secondees secured through Shell fostered progress, but indirectly 
lowered entrepreneurial spirit and created a sub-culture within the 
company 
People 
(2004) 
To unify the corporate culture all secondees were asked to become 
full employees of the spinout, or leave the company 
People 
(2005) 
New CEO recruited from the spinouts internal ranks to increase focus 
on commercial aspects of running a company 
Finance + : Sufficient finances were successfully secured for further de-risking 
and new business development 
Finance - : Due to legion available resources a relatively high cash burn rate 
(given the size and strategy of the spinout) was facilitated 
Finance - : Initially insufficient budgetary prudence and financial control was 
in place to curb the set cash-burn rate 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Finance 
(2003) 
Gradually more financial prudence and financial monitoring processes 
were introduced and strictly applied 
Finance 
(2005) 
A downsize of spinout (-25% employees) is executed to achieve a 
modus operandi with a stronger commercial foundation. 
Governance + : Required technical support by 10 Shell-secondees was set-up 
quickly, next to legal & safety support, which fostered progress 
Governance - : It proved challenging for the spinout to align its many governance 
partners represented in the board due to diverse expectations 
Governance 
 
- : Shell acted relatively inactive as a customer and sponsor of the new 
technology commercialized by its spinout 
Governance 
(2003) 
Bringing in a Venture Capitalist firm as a key shareholder was a good 
decision as it increased focus and commercial discipline 
Governance 
(2003-2007) 
Alignment between involved parties improved since 2005 by 
gradually phasing out smaller shareholders of the spinout through 
subsequent investment rounds  
Governance 
(2007) 
Renewed initiatives from both sides strengthened the relationship 
between Shell and its spinout, leading to Shell becoming a main 
customer of Avantium in 2007 
 
 
 
 
 49
Figure 1. Framework for assessing the set-up and management of spinouts   
 
 
 
 
